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ONE SAYS THE THINGS WHICH ONE FEELS THE 
NEED TO SAY, AND WHICH THE OTHER WILL NOT 
UNDERSTAND:1 SLOVAK PENSION CASES BEFORE THE 
CJEU AND CZECH COURTS
Agata B Capik* and Martin Petschko**2
In a spectacular decision, in 2012 the Czech Constitutional Court dec-
lared the Landtová judgment of the CJEU ultra vires and therefore 
inapplicable on the territory of that Member State. The CJEU’s 
judgment was rendered following a request for a prelimi-
nary ruling by the Czech Supreme Administrative Court. The 
real and underlying conflict, however, was of an internal na-
ture and took place between two of the highest courts of the 
Czech Republic well into 2013, making it an illustrative example of how 
the mechanisms of judicial dialogue actually work in practice. This 
contribution first looks at both the horizontal and vertical aspects of 
the so-called Slovak Pension Cases. It further assesses them from the 
perspective of judicial dialogue in its procedural and substantial 
features, while finally discerning possible consequences that the ultra 
vires decision of the Czech Constitutional Court might bring about.
1 Introduction
One cannot but describe the recent interactions between some of 
the Czech judiciary’s most prominent courts and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) with respect to the so-called Slovak Pension 
Cases as a saga.3 All of the necessary elements of a drama are present: a 
prominent divorce, desire for money, and finally a struggle for authority 
and influence. Moreover, it includes a great deal of suspense as well as 
surprising twists and turns. However, one might argue whether it should 
qualify as a drama or rather as a farce.
1 The title of this contribution is inspired by a quote by Marcel Proust from In Search of 
Lost Time.
*  Agata B Capik is a former post-doctoral researcher at the Centre for European Law at the 
University of Luxembourg, and is currently head of the ‘Law of Europe’ research project.
**  Martin Petschko is a research associate at the University of Luxembourg.
2 The authors wish to thank Professor Michal Bobek, Dr Maja Brkan and Dr Adam Ła-
zowski for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The usual disclaimer 
applies.
3 For the purposes of this contribution, the term Slovak Pension Cases is not limited to 
the underlying cases brought before the Czech courts, but also includes the preliminary 
references lodged with the CJEU. 
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The Slovak Pension Cases led the Constitutional Court of the Czech 
Republic (Ústavní soud České republiky (CCC)) to declare4 the CJEU’s 
2011 Landtová judgment5 ultra vires. The CCC’s remarkable determina-
tion was swiftly put into question by its Brno neighbour, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of the Czech Republic (Nejvyšší správní soud České 
republiky (SAC)). The latter initiated further preliminary ruling procee-
dings before the CJEU6 based on a set of facts similar to those underlying 
Landtová. The stage was thus set for a brilliant finale and the audien-
ce held their breath, waiting for the CJEU’s decision. However, before a 
judgment could be rendered, the SAC reluctantly withdrew its request, 
after the case had been settled by means of an out-of-court settlement at 
the national level.7
The Slovak Pension Cases saga represents a longstanding jurispru-
dential debate between two of the highest courts in the Czech Republic, 
making it an illustrative example of how the mechanisms of judicial di-
alogue actually work in practice with regard to form and content. More-
over, it raises certain interesting procedural questions at the European 
Union level, particularly regarding the uniform application of European 
Union law. Thus, for a number of reasons, the proceedings in the Slovak 
Pension Cases can be characterised as quite spectacular. Whether this 
same attribute can be applied to the consequences that such proceedin-
gs will ultimately produce – and the implications thereof on the EU legal 
order as a whole – remains, for the time being, significantly more difficult 
to discern. 
This contribution will begin by describing the Slovak Pension Cases, 
including their horizontal aspect, ie first and foremost the interaction 
between the CCC and SAC, as well as their vertical aspect, which develo-
ped between these courts and the CJEU. As a second step, it will aim at 
assessing these developments from the perspective of judicial dialogue. 
This second part will be further subdivided into a section on the material 
and procedural aspects of the cases at hand, and also a section on the 
ultra vires review, which will suggest possible conclusions to be drawn 
from these proceedings. 
4 Czech Constitutional Court, Slovak Pensions XVIII, judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. 
ÚS 5/12. An English language translation is available on the official CCC website: <http://
www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37&cHash=911a315c9c22ea1989d19a3
a848724e2> accessed 27 December 2013. 
5 Case C-399/09 Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení [2011] ECR 
I-5573.
6 Application in Case C-253/12 JS v Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení, reference for a 
preliminary ruling lodged on 24 May 2012 [2012] OJ EU C273/2.
7 Order of the Court in Case C-253/12 (n 6) of 27 March 2013 that the case be removed 
from the register [2013] OJ EU C225/57.
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2 Facts and proceedings
An entire discussion of all the ins and outs of the various procee-
dings in the Slovak Pension Cases is far beyond the scope of this contri-
bution.8 In a nutshell, however, the essential, underlying dispute arose 
in the wake of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
then known as Czechoslovakia.9 The two resulting countries, the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic (Slovakia) concluded a bilateral treaty10 
governing the responsibility and calculation of individual pension rights 
that had been acquired under the Czechoslovakian regime (the Bilate-
ral Treaty).11 It established that each state would take responsibility for 
individual pension rights based on the employer’s headquarters on 31 
December 1992. After that date, the respective legislation of each of the 
two States would apply to determine pension rights acquired by indivi-
dual employees. Accordingly, pension rights acquired by an individual 
working for an employer having its headquarters in Slovakia would be 
governed by Slovakia’s legal regime and administered by its authorities,12 
and vice versa.
Over time, however, due to differences in the economic development 
occurring in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, pension benefits deve-
loped at a far slower rate in Slovakia,13 resulting in Slovakian pension 
payments that were substantially lower than their Czech equivalent.14 
8 For a concise description of the underlying facts and procedural history, cf Pavel Molek, 
‘The Court that Roared: The Czech Constitutional Court Declaring War of Independence 
against the ECJ’ (2012) 6 ELR 162-169.
9 Based on Constitutional Act Number 542/1992 Coll, adopted by the former Federal 
Assembly on 25 November 1992, the Federation’s dissolution date was established as 31 
December 1992. Subsequently, as of 1 January 1993, both new States took over the autho-
rity entrusted previously by constitutional and other acts to the former federation.
10 Smlouva mezi Českou republikou a Slovenskou republikou o sociálním zabezpečení 
(Agreement between the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic on Social Security), signed 
on 29 October 1992. A Czech language version is available at <http://www.mpsv.cz/files/
clanky/1542/smlouva_slovensko.pdf> accessed 27 December 2013. 
11 In Czechoslovakia, the pension system used to be within the competence of the federa-
tion, while the republics fulfilled only certain functions of a rather administrative nature in 
such matters. Cf Robert Zbíral, ‘Czech Constitutional Court, Judgment of 31 January 2012, 
Pl. ÚS 5/12, A Legal Revolution or Negligible Episode? Court of Justice Decision proclaimed 
Ultra Vires’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 1-18, 2.
12 Art 20(1) of the Bilateral Treaty provides that: ‘periods of insurance completed before 
the date of dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic shall be considered to be 
periods of insurance completed in the contracting State on whose territory the employer of 
the person concerned had its headquarters either on the day of the dissolution, or on the 
last day before that date.’ Quoted from Landtová (n 5). 
13 This is no longer the case, due to the social security reforms undertaken by the Slovak 
government. Cf Molek (n 8) 167. 
14 Jan Komárek, ‘Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a 
Judgment of the Court of Justice Ultra Vires: Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, 
Slovak Pensions XVII’, (2012) 8 European Constitutional LR 323-337; Zbíral (n 11), 2. 
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This disparity engendered considerable discontent among individuals 
who, although living in the Czech Republic, had worked for employers 
with headquarters in Slovakia, as those individuals received the lower 
Slovakian pensions rather than the higher Czech ones. Consequently, 
employees who had done essentially the same work, but in different pla-
ces, ended up receiving different pension payments. To rectify this percei-
ved inequity, the Czech Social Security Administration (CSA)15 sometimes 
chose to provide an ex gratia compensatory supplement that was inten-
ded to alleviate hardship, a practice which complied with the Bilateral 
Treaty. However, a number of applications for such a supplement were 
denied on the basis that the underlying pension was slightly too high and 
did not result in the pensioner suffering from hardship, even though the 
pensions were still below the Czech average. Such decisions were un-
successfully challenged before the relevant Czech administrative courts, 
including the SAC. These claims, however, met with far greater success 
before the CCC.16 Unlike the SAC, the CCC held that a decision to deny 
the supplement to some while granting it to others who were similarly-
situated was incompatible with the right to social security in old age and 
the principle of equality.17 
The SAC, on the other hand, remained unconvinced by the CCC’s re-
asoning.18 Consequently, it raised two challenges in the next case it heard 
subsequent to the CCC decision. Firstly, as it determined that Regulation 
1408/71 (the Regulation) applied, and Article 12 thereof prohibited the 
taking into account of pension periods more than once, the SAC questi-
oned whether the compensatory supplement was incompatible with the 
Regulation, as it amounted to taking an individual’s pension periods into 
account more than was permitted by the Regulation. Secondly, the SAC 
questioned whether it was in line with EU law to restrict the compen-
15 The CSA is the financial organisation of the Czech public administration, falling under 
the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Cf <http://www.cssz.cz/en/about-cssa/> 
accessed 27 December 2013.
16 See, inter alia, Czech Constitutional Court, Slovak Pensions judgment of 20 March 2007, 
Pl. ÚS 4/06, as well as the judgment of 12 August 2010, III. ÚS 1012/10. 
17 The Czech Constitutional Court had already decided, in its constitutionally conforming 
interpretation judgment of 25 January 2005, III. ÚS 252/04, that Article 20(1) of the Agree-
ment must be applied in such a way that ‘where a national of the Czech Republic satisfies the 
statutory conditions for entitlement to a pension, the amount of which as set by national law 
(of the Czech Republic) is greater than that laid down by the Agreement, it is for the Czech 
Social Security Administration to ensure that the retirement pension is of an amount equi-
valent to the higher entitlement set by national legislation and to order that the amount of 
the retirement pension paid by the other contracting party be supplemented, taking account 
of the retirement pension paid by the other contracting party under the Agreement in order 
to avoid double payment of two retirement pensions of the same kind, granted on the same 
grounds by two separate social security institutions’. See also Slovak Pensions (n 16).
18 For details on the internal dialogue between the SAC and CCC, see, inter alia, Molek (n 
8) 163. 
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satory supplements exclusively to Czech citizens residing in the Czech 
Republic. Accordingly, the SAC referred the case to the CJEU,19 seeking 
a resolution of these two questions.20
Eventually, the CJEU answered both questions in the negative. With 
respect to the first one, it found that:
the provisions of point 6 of Annex III(A) to Regulation No 1408/71, 
read in conjunction with Article 7(2)(c) thereof, do not preclude a 
national rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
provides for payment of a supplement to old age benefit where the 
amount of such benefit, awarded under Article 20 of the Agreement, 
is lower than that which would have been received if the retirement 
pension had been calculated in accordance with the legal rules of the 
Czech Republic.21
Thus, according to the CJEU, providing compensatory supplements 
was compatible with the Regulation. However, the answer to the second 
question had an entirely different impact on such compensatory supple-
ments:
[T]he combined provisions of Articles 3(1) and 10 of Regulation No 
1408/71 preclude a national rule, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which allows payment of a supplement to old age be-
nefit solely to Czech nationals residing in the territory of the Czech 
Republic, but it does not necessarily follow, under EU law, that an 
individual who satisfies those two requirements should be deprived 
of such a payment.22
Therefore, while the CJEU found compensatory supplements to be 
compatible with EU law, it insisted on a non-discriminatory application 
of the rule, thereby leaving the CSA with considerable room to manoeu-
vre. In essence, it could decide to give the compensatory supplement to 
everyone or no one.23 
Once it had received the CJEU’s judgment, the SAC issued its de-
cision in the case.24 It held that firstly the CCC’s jurisprudence was in-
19 Landtová (n 5). 
20 This reference for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 12 EC and 
Articles 3(1), 7(2)(c), 10 and 46 of Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on 
the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons 
and to members of their families moving within the Community, as amended and updated 
by Council Regulation (EC) 118/97 of 2 December 1996 [1997] OJ EC L28/1 and as amen-
ded by Regulation (EC) 629/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2006 [2006] OJ EU L114/1, and point 6 of Annex III(A) to Regulation No 1408/71.
21 Landtová (n 5) para 40.
22 Landtová (n 5) para 54.
23 Landtová (n 5) para 41-49. 
24 Czech Supreme Administrative Court, decision of 31 August 2011, 6 Ads 52/2009-88.
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consistent with the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law and secondly that, 
even though the SAC respected both, faced with these two irreconcilable 
jurisprudential approaches, it would follow the CJEU. Only exceptionally 
would it give precedence to the CCC’s jurisprudence in cases where the 
latter invoked the hard core of the constitution’s primacy vis-à-vis EU 
law. The latter, therefore, upheld the CSA’s decision to refuse to accord 
the compensatory supplement to the applicant. Consequently, the SAC 
arguably won the ‘war’ between the Czech Courts, although its victory 
was fleeting.25
Subsequently, in a move that was both unprecedented and that took 
most observers by surprise, the CCC launched a counter-attack. When 
the next case similar to Landtová came before it, the CCC declared the 
latter to be ultra vires, so that it had no force or effect in the Czech Re-
public. The CCC was clearly disgruntled by the CJEU’s ruling, as it had 
rejected the former’s reasoning and must have appeared to be undermi-
ning the CCC’s authority over the SAC.26 The CCC therefore decided to 
hit back and in administering its response, it reasoned that in the first 
place the Regulation was not even applicable, since the case at hand did 
not contain any cross-border element, as the underlying facts took place 
entirely within Czechoslovakia. The Czech Republic was, therefore, in a 
position to apply only the Bilateral Treaty and not EU law, and the com-
pensatory supplements were legal pursuant to the former. Secondly, the 
Bilateral Treaty could be applied independently of the Regulation becau-
se, even if the Regulation was applicable, the Bilateral Treaty was spe-
cifically mentioned in the Regulation’s Annex III, which meant that the 
Bilateral Treaty remained independently applicable. In the CCC’s view, 
all treaties mentioned therein could and should be applied independently 
of the Regulation, and even more importantly, also independently of EU 
law in general. Thus, according to the CCC’s reasoning, there was no 
requirement to apply the rules contained in the Bilateral Treaty in a non-
discriminatory manner. Rather, because the EU’s general prohibition of 
discrimination was not applicable to the Bilateral Treaty, it was perfectly 
acceptable to limit compensatory supplements to only Czech nationals 
resident in the Czech Republic. Finally, the CCC held, using harsh and 
highly critical language, that the CJEU had transgressed the powers 
transferred to it by the Member States and consequently, the Landtová 
decision was not applicable in the Czech Republic.27
25 For an overview of the CCC and SAC decisions on Slovak Pensions see, inter alia, Molek 
(n 8) 163-165, with further references. 
26 Czech Constitutional Court, Slovak Pension XVII judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 
5/12, concerning a Czech national who had worked for many years in Bratislava before the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. 
27 However, the material singularity of such a statement is not the only remarkable as-
pect of the CCC’s judgment. In addition to those of a more material nature, there is the 
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It is obvious that the CCC intended to bring this thorny saga to a 
dramatic, yet-definitive, close. However, it underestimated the SAC’s re-
solve to have the final word. Although the SAC had, throughout its early 
jurisprudence, suggested its willingness to follow the CCC’s decisions28 
to the extent it could legitimately do so in accordance with applicable 
EU law, it subsequently decided to challenge the CCC’s authority. When 
another similar case came before it, the SAC quickly seized the opportu-
nity to initiate yet another request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, 
essentially looking to the CJEU to help it resolve the Czech courts’ power 
struggle.29 There was one question which could provoke an answer with 
far-reaching implications, specifically:
Does European Union law prevent the national court, which is the 
highest court in the State in the field of administrative law and 
against whose decision there is no right of appeal, from being, in 
accordance with national law, bound by the legal assessment of the 
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic where that assessment 
seems not to be in accordance with Union law as interpreted by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (emphasis added)?
However, in February 2013 the SAC withdrew this request for a pre-
liminary ruling, as the underlying dispute had been solved by means of 
an out-of-court settlement. 
3 Reflections on judicial dialogue
3.1 Material and procedural aspects
The pointillist picture provided above has already made clear that 
the Slovak Pension Cases are deserving of attention in many respects. 
The following sections assess Landtová from the theoretical standpoint of 
judicial dialogue. We will evaluate those aspects of the saga that provide 
an insight into judicial dialogue in action, thereby contributing to a better 
understanding of its strengths and shortcomings. 
The legal phenomenon of judicial dialogue, together with the preli-
minary reference procedure as its pivotal tool and the main communica-
tion channel between national courts and the CJEU, constitutes a vital 
feature of the European legal order due to the particular character of the 
judgment’s phrasing that can hardly be qualified as other than forceful or, during certain 
passages, even aggressive. At least this is true for the English language translation available 
on the CCC’s official website.
28 Molek (n 8) 163.
29 Case C-253/12 (n 6). The subsequent removal from the register was performed by the 
Order of 27 March 2013 (n 7).
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CJEU’s jurisdiction.30 This has been extensively discussed in both insti-
tutional31 and academic32 forums. Nevertheless, it was only in Kempter33 
that the CJEU, following the Opinion of Advocate General Bot,34 stated 
expressis verbis that ‘the preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue betwe-
en one court and another’,35 thus making for the very first time an explicit 
reference to dialogue between the CJEU and national courts.36 
Against this backdrop, a selection of procedural and material questi-
ons raised by the Slovak Pension Cases will now be discussed, followed 
by an observation with regard to the ultra vires review.
30 Francis Geoffrey Jacobs, ‘Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: 
The European Court of Justice’, (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 547-557, 548. 
For the importance of a harmonious working relationship between the CJEU and national 
courts see, inter alia, Case 16/65 Schwarze/Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Fu-
ttermittel [1965] ECR 877; Case 107/76 Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Centrafarm Vertriebsge-
sellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH [1977] ECR 957; Case C-99/00 Criminal pro-
ceedings against Kenny Roland Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-4839.
31 See, inter alia, ‘Report on the Future of the Judicial System of the European Union’ 
(1999), followed by Working Party for the European Commission (Ole Due), ‘Report of the 
Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court System’ (Brussels 2000) 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/pdf/due_en.pdf> accessed 27 Decem-
ber 2013; Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions 
of the European Union, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
(The Hague 2007), available at <http://www.juradmin.eu/en/newsletter/pdf/Hr_20-En.
pdf> accessed 27 December 2013; Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
(Diana Wallis), ‘Report on the Role of the National Judge in the European Judicial System’ 
(A6-0224/2008), which led to the European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2008 on the 
role of the national judge in the European judicial system (2007/2027(INI)). All documents 
leading to the Resolution and the Resolution itself are available at <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2008-0224&language=EN> 
accessed 27 December 2013. 
32 Going back to at least Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds), 
The European Court of Justice and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal 
Changes in its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998). To name the most recent: Arthur 
Dyevre, ‘Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal Order: Isolated Accident or 
Omen of Judicial Armageddon?’ (15 June 2012). Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2084639> accessed 27 December 2013; Emmanuelle Bribosia, Laurent Scheeck 
and Amaya Úbeda de Torres, L’Europe des Cours. Loyautés et résistances (Emile Bruylant 
2010); Monica Claes, Maartje de Visser, Patricia Popelier and Catherine Van de Heyning 
(eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe (Intersentia 2012); Filippo Fontanelli, Giusep-
pe Martinico and Paolo Carrozza, Shaping Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and 
Supranational Experiences (Europa Law Publishing 2010); François Lichère, Laurence Po-
tvin-Solis and Arnaud Raynouard, Le dialogue entre les juges européens et nationaux: incan-
tation ou réalité ? (Emile Bruylant 2004).
33 Case C-2/06 Willy Kempter KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2008] ECR I-411.
34 Kempter (n 33) Opinion of AG Bot, para 101.
35 Kempter (n 33) para 42.
36 Cf Xavier Groussot, ‘Spirit, Are You There? Reinforced Judicial Dialogue and the Preli-
minary Ruling Procedure’, Eric Stein Working Papers (2008) 4, available at <http://www.
ericsteinpapers.cz/info/papers/2008-4> accessed 11 November 2013; Diana-Urania Ga-
letta, Procedural Autonomy of EU Member States: Paradise Lost? A Study on the ‘Functiona-
lized Procedural Competence’ of EU Member States (Springer 2010) 58. 
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As indicated above, the proceedings in themselves were relatively 
straightforward, inasmuch as they displayed many features typical of 
such preliminary references that also involve an internal power struggle 
between national courts. These can schematically be described as follows: 
National Court A disapproves of a specific legal approach its superior 
Court B applies in its jurisprudence. In an effort to undermine Court 
B’s authority, Court A lodges a preliminary reference with the CJEU. 
Eventually, the CJEU reaffirms Court A’s position, thereby allowing it to 
legitimately oppose Court B’s approach.37 This effect may be labelled as 
‘authority corroding’. 
When assessing the Slovak Pension Cases from the wider perspec-
tive of judicial dialogue, the phenomenon described above elaborately 
shows that in practice such dialogue is far from always being entertained 
with mutual respect and understanding.38 Less noble factors and moti-
ves, such as the struggle for judicial power, play an equally important 
role. In this respect, the Slovak Pension Cases constitute a compelling 
example of the challenge that arises in constitutional courts via the use 
of preliminary reference procedures by courts of lower instance. One may 
discern two distinct categories of this phenomenon, which incidentally is 
already predetermined by primary EU law39 and the specific interpreta-
tion this procedure receives from the CJEU. On the one hand, national 
courts have no restrictions regarding their interpretation of material law 
and on the other there are no procedural restrictions regarding the aut-
hority of their constitutional courts.40 
With regard to the first category, the corrosion of ‘material autho-
rity’, the Slovak Pension Cases are instructive, as they involve a struggle 
for the correct material interpretation of law between two national courts. 
Which of the two courts, however, had the better legal arguments with 
regard to the interpretation of the Regulation? Was the CCC right in its 
approach? An assessment of this question will show that the CCC missed 
important points and that the conclusions it drew can hardly be upheld.
Firstly, claiming that Regulation 1408/71 was not applicable due to 
the lack of a cross-border element appears unsustainable. The provisions 
of Article 2 define the preconditions that have to be met in order to esta-
blish its applicability. The mere fact that a person is subject to the legi-
37 For a more detailed assessment of this phenomenon, see M Bobek, ‘The Impact of the 
European Mandate of Ordinary Courts on the Position of Constitutional Courts’, in Claes, 
de Visser, Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 32) 287-308.
38 Elinia Paunio, ‘Conflict, Power and Understanding: Judicial Dialogue between the ECJ 
and National Courts’, (2010) 7 No Foundations 5-24.
39 Art 267 TFEU, Art 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 93-118 of the Rules of 
Procedure before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
40 Further distinctions can be found in Bobek (n 37) 292.
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slation of one or two Member States suffices in this respect. As the appli-
cants in the cases at hand were undoubtedly subject to the legislation of 
a Member State, there is no room for doubt: Regulation 1408/71 applies. 
Secondly, the conclusions drawn by the CCC from the fact that the 
Bilateral Treaty appears in Annex III of Regulation 1408/71 are erroneo-
us. The Bilateral Treaty is incorporated in Part A of the Annex, which 
mentions all social security conventions that are still applicable regard-
less of the Regulation’s entry into force. However, the conventions of Part 
A have to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, as the principles of 
EU law clearly apply (as opposed to those of Part B, which may include 
discriminatory measures). The reason for such an extraordinary slip on 
the part of the CCC has given rise to a certain measure of speculation.41 
What is clear is that the two main material pillars upon which the CCC 
founded its decision are extremely difficult to uphold, not to mention that 
the arguments are simply incorrect.
As already indicated above, the Landtová saga further merits atten-
tion with regard to the second category, namely the circumvention of pro-
cedural authority. According to the CJEU’s case law, on the one hand na-
tional courts are entitled to ignore procedural rules requiring them to first 
refer a matter to their constitutional court before making a reference to 
Luxembourg.42 On the other hand, superior courts do not enjoy the com-
petence to prevent national courts of a lower instance from lodging preli-
minary references in an effort to affirm their authority.43 That the Landtová 
saga touches upon many of these neuralgic questions and is therefore a 
particularly representative case in this respect has already become clear. 
In the context described above, one move of the CCC appears par-
ticularly odd. After having lodged its preliminary reference in Landtová, 
the SAC suspended a couple of similar cases. One of the parties concer-
ned appealed against this decision to the CCC and the latter annulled 
the underlying decision of the SAC, essentially arguing that a reference 
was not necessary due to the unequivocal case law of the CCC, and that 
the SAC was bound by it.44 This clearly appears to be in conflict with the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU as mentioned above.45
The particular irony of Landtová, however, is that in this specific 
case the preliminary reference procedure might have actually strengthe-
41 Zbíral (n 11) 10.
42 Cf Case C-348/89 Mecanarte - Metalúrgica da Lagoa Ldª v Chefe do Serviço da Conferência 
Final da Alfândega do Porto [1991] ECR I-3277. 
43 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] ECR I-9641 and Case C-173/09 
Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa [2010] ECR I-8889.
44 Zbíral (n 11) 11. This reaction by the CCC demonstrates how seriously it took the chall-
enge to its authority.
45 Elchinov and Cartesio (n 43).
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ned the CCC’s position and saved it a considerable amount of trouble. 
Had the CCC only launched a preliminary reference itself, the CJEU’s 
judgment46 would have provided the necessary flexibility for the CCC to 
further apply its approach and grant the compensatory supplement to all 
Czech citizens. The only concession the CCC would have had to make is 
that non-citizens would also have had to be entitled to it.
After having had a look at the authority corroding effect the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure can display, the following analysis aims at provi-
ding an answer to the question why the CCC actually reacted in such an 
uncompromising way vis-à-vis the SAC as well as the CJEU - a task that 
is not easy to accomplish. The CCC’s jurisprudence up to this point had 
provided little indication to this effect.47 On the contrary, the previous 
relationship between the CCC and the SAC was one characterised by 
respect and as being ‘fruitful’.48 Whenever the CCC was called upon to 
decide in cases pertaining to European integration and its impact upon 
the Czech legal system, it would appear fair to describe its stance as not 
particularly critical, or in other words as pro-European.49 From the outsi-
de point of view of a scholarly observer, its motivation seems in fact to 
stem from sources other than strictly legal ones.50 
To begin with a very broad and abstract remark, there are fac-
tors that corroborate the presumption that the CCC was in part driven 
by a motivation that goes back to the roots of the case. The particular 
attachment the CCC displayed with regard to the Slovak Pension Cases 
might be explained by its resolve to spare Czech citizens any harm poten-
tially attributable to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, as this had been 
predominantly engineered by the political elite of the country and was 
never subject to a referendum.51
Furthermore, the particular way the procedure before the CJEU de-
veloped was certainly not to the liking of the CCC. For example, the fact 
46 Under the assumption that the CJEU would have come to the same conclusions in such 
a judgment, which appears perfectly justifiable.
47 Czech Constitutional Court, Sugar Quotas III judgment of 8 March 2006, Pl. ÚS 50/04; 
European Arrest Warrant judgment of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04; Lisbon Treaty I judgment 
of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÚS 19/08; Non-Applicability of Contested Provision judgment of 
2 December 2008, PL. ÚS 12/08; Lisbon Treaty II judgment of 3 November 2009, PL. ÚS 
29/09. An English language translation of all the judgments is available at <http://www.
concourt.cz/view/726> accessed 27 December 2013.
48 Molek (n 8) 162.
49 Jan M Passer, ‘The Relation between EU Fundamental Rights and those Recognized in 
the Constitutions of the Member States: Competition or Complementarity?’ Speech delive-
red at the Conference on Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU: Future Challenges, 
Section 2 – How to Manage the Pluralism of Sources of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 
Luxembourg 22 October 2012. This assessment holds true even though the CCC has actu-
ally never itself lodged a preliminary reference procedure.
50 This interpretation is confirmed by Molek (n 8) 168 with further references.
51 Molek (n 8) 168.
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that the Czech Government, as an intervenient in the proceedings before 
the CJEU, had claimed that the CCC’s jurisprudence in this respect was 
contrary to EU law is fairly unusual.52 The fact that its own government 
had ‘stabbed it in the back’ seems to have contributed to a general feeling 
of distrust within the CCC. The CCC was certainly not about to accept 
such an accusation, and considered the case to have not been properly 
defended before the CJEU. The CCC therefore saw only one remaining 
way to inform the CJEU of the positions it had taken. Imaginative minds 
may even perceive this step as the failed attempt of a judicial dialogue: 
the CCC simply drafted a letter stating its case. Unsurprisingly, however, 
the CJEU’s Registry returned the letter, as the CCC was in no way asso-
ciated with the proceedings, stating that ‘according to what is established 
practice, the members of the CJEU do not exchange correspondence with 
third parties concerning the cases submitted to the CJEU’.53 The CCC’s 
pride was obviously hurt, as it took up this point in its judgment by sta-
ting that: 
the ECJ regularly makes use of the institution of amici curiae in 
proceedings on preliminary questions, especially in relation to the 
European Commission. In a situation where the ECJ was aware that 
the Czech Republic, as a party to the proceeding, in whose name 
the government acted, expressed in its statement a negative positi-
on on the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court, which was the 
subject matter for evaluation, the ECJ statement that the Constitu-
tional Court was a ‘third party’ in the case at hand cannot be seen 
otherwise than as abandoning the principle audiatur et altera pars.
Given that the rules that are applicable to proceedings before the 
CJEU54 do not provide for such contact with national courts in a situation 
as the one in Landtová, it is difficult to see in what way this would amo-
unt to a violation of a procedural principle. Given that the CCC further 
qualified the CJEU’s behaviour as amounting to ‘deficiencies concerning 
the safeguards of a fair trial in the proceeding before the ECJ in Case 
C-399/09’,55 it merits particular attention that, in accordance with the 
normative approach of public international law – borrowed subsequently 
by EU law56 – the right to a fair trial is a norm designed to protect indivi-
duals from the unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of fun-
damental rights and freedoms. It thus appears fairly inappropriate that 
52 For further details in this respect, cf Zbíral (n 11) 4.
53 Czech Constitutional Court (n 26). 
54 Especially Arts 93-118 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [2012] OJ EU L 265/1.
55 Czech Constitutional Court, judgment of 31 January 2012, PL. US 05/12. 
56 The right to a fair trial and defence are set out in Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
latter being mentioned expressis verbis in the provisions of Article 6 TEU.
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the CCC, which in fact is the guardian of rights in the Czech Republic,57 
argues as though courts equally enjoyed such rights. 
Against the backdrop of even the Constitutional Court of a Member 
State being manifestly unaware of the specific purpose and functions of 
amici curiae,58 it is justified to enquire as to how solid the national courts’ 
knowledge regarding the features of the preliminary ruling procedure 
actually is. Incidentally, this question is in no way a new one, particularly 
since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007.59 Familiarity with the proce-
dural requirements before the CJEU has already been a subject of dis-
cussion at different forums60 for many years,61 and an apparent majority 
of judges (54%) regarded themselves as familiar with the procedure.62 At 
that time, only 13% of judges in the Czech Republic considered themse-
lves ‘unfamiliar’ with it.63 These numbers are elaborately exemplified by 
the Slovak Pension Cases. 
It has become clear that the CCC’s hurt pride played a considerable 
role in its uncompromising reaction. Unfortunately, the triggering mo-
ment for this may very well have had to do with a certain lack of fami-
liarity regarding the rules of procedure applicable before the CJEU. The 
CCC is by no means the only national court that is faced with deficiencies 
of this kind.
57 Krcmar v the Czech Republic App no 35376/97 (ECtHR, 3 March 2000). The State is 
under a positive obligation to take all steps necessary to ensure that these rights are gua-
ranteed in practice as well as in theory, including the organisation of the judiciary. 
58 Conf Art 23 Statute of the Court of Justice read in conjunction with Art 96.1(c) Rules 
of Procedure of the Court of Justice with regard to the well-defined role of the European 
Commission within the mechanics of the preliminary ruling procedure in all its forms, PPA 
and PPU included.
59 Although in fairness it is certainly not only the so-called ‘new’ Member States that raise 
questions in this respect. According to the abovementioned Report of the Committee on 
Legal Affairs of the European Parliament (n 31), the majority of Belgian and French respon-
dents (87% and 94% respectively) considered themselves unfamiliar with the preliminary 
ruling procedure at that time. Cf p 21 of the Report.
60 Within the European institutions, as well as the Association of the Councils of State and 
Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union. 
61 ‘As a first priority, the working group recommends to raise the level of knowledge of 
European law of all judges.’ Cf Report of the Working Group on the Preliminary Ruling 
Procedure (n 31) 5. However, one should also keep in mind that this issue had already 
been mentioned before the Enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Cf Report on the Future of the 
Judicial System of the European Union, (1999) and the so-called Ole Due Report (n 31).
62 According to the Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
(n 31), 32% of the respondents were unfamiliar with the procedure, while 14% were very 
familiar. The Report showed the differences between the various Member States. Austrian, 
Czech and German respondents considered themselves the least unfamiliar with the proce-
dure (12%, 13% and 18% of ‘unfamiliar’ responses respectively). 
63 According to the Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament (n 
31). These are the most recent data available in this field.
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Let us come back to the point of departure, ie the role, meaning and 
functions of the preliminary reference system and the lessons to be learnt 
in this respect from the Slovak Pension Cases. It is fundamental to keep 
in mind that the maintenance of the rule of law in European integration 
can only be successful if it is understood as a common endeavour and 
joint responsibility of the European Courts in Luxembourg and the nati-
onal courts. A possible moral of the Slovak Pension Cases experience may 
therefore be making proper use of the procedural mechanisms offered by 
the European legal system and entering into a real dialogue.
3.2 Ultra vires review
A question that automatically comes to mind when discussing judi-
cial dialogue is that of ultimate authority, in other words: Who has the 
last say? An extensive discussion of the concept of ultra vires review with 
respect to acts of organs of the European Union can only be achieved in 
a framework larger than the one of the present contribution. One point 
should, however, be mentioned. The CCC repeatedly makes reference to 
the relevant jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(GFCC), which can be traced further back, but which was put forward 
as early as the Maastricht decision,64 stating that ‘legal acts of the Uni-
on which exceed the competences outlined in the treaty, as interpreted 
by the German court will not be legally binding in Germany’.65 After the 
ensuing Lisbon decision that reaffirmed the GFCC’s hitherto claims,66 
the latter took a step backwards in the Honeywell decision.67 Further to 
introducing specific requirements for the use of such powers, the GFCC 
also strengthened the role of the CJEU in this concept, and thus the 
mechanism of judicial dialogue, by stating that:
64 German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) judgment of 12 October 
1993 in cases 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92. For academic appraisal see, inter alia, Steve 
J Boom, ‘The European Union after the Maastricht Decision: Is Germany the “Virginia of 
Europe”?’ (1995) 5 Jean Monnet Working Paper available at <http://centers.law.nyu.edu/
jeanmonnet/archive/papers/95/9505ind.html> accessed 27 December 2013; Carl Otto 
Lenz, ‘Der europäische Grundrechtsstandard in der Rechtsprechung der Europäischen Ge-
richtshofs’, (1993) 20 EuGZ 585; Carl Otto Lenz, ‘Der Vertrag von Maastricht nach dem 
Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ (1993) 47 NJW 3038-3039; Christian Tomuschat, 
‘Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ (1993) EuGZ 
20, 489; JHH Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and 
the German Maastricht Decision’ (1995) 1 ELJ 219-258. 
65 Maastricht judgment (n 64). Cf Boom (n 64).
66 German Federal Constitutional Court, Lisbon judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfG, 2 
BvE 2/08. An official English language translation is available at <http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 27 December 2013.
67 German Federal Constitutional Court, Honeywell judgment of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 
2661/06. An official English language translation is available at <http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html> accessed 27 December 2013.
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Prior to the acceptance of an ultra vires act on the part of the Euro-
pean bodies and institutions, the Court of Justice is therefore to be 
afforded the opportunity to interpret the Treaties, as well as to rule 
on the validity and interpretation of the legal acts in question, in the 
context of preliminary ruling proceedings according to Article 267 
TFEU. As long as the Court of Justice did not have an opportunity 
to rule on the questions of Union law which have arisen, the Federal 
Constitutional Court may not find any inapplicability of Union law 
for Germany.68
In spite of the fact that the CCC strongly relies on the GFCC when it 
comes to the establishment of a dogmatic foundation for its competence 
to exercise an ultra vires review, it does however avoid going down this 
road to the very (and decisive) end by not making a reference itself befo-
re declaring a judgment by the CJEU ultra vires.69 As is well known, the 
CCC is not the only national court to reject the CJEU’s assertion of hie-
rarchical authority over national courts in questions related to European 
Union law.70 The CCC’s judgment is, however, still an outstanding one, as 
for the first time the constitutional court of a Member State did not only 
claim to possess the competence of ultra vires review, but actually exer-
cised it. Given the extraordinary character of this act, one would have 
expected to find a deliberately well-drafted and meticulously well-argued 
passage in the judgment of the CCC, underpinning such competence. 
However, in this respect the CCC merely states 
that there were excesses on the part of a European Union body ... a 
situation occurred in which an act by a European body exceeded the 
powers that the Czech Republic transferred to the European Union 
under Art 10a of the Constitution; this exceeded the scope of the 
transferred powers and was ultra vires.71 
Surprisingly, the CCC did not therefore provide a valid and compre-
hensible foundation for the competence it exercises. 
68 Honeywell (n 67) para 60.
69 The fact that the CCC has actually never lodged a reference for a preliminary ruling has 
already been pointed out above. 
70 See, inter alia, the decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Solange 
I judgment of 19 May 1976, BVerfGE 37, 271; Solange II judgment of 22 October 1986, 2 
BvR 197/83; Maastricht (n 64); Lisbon (n 66); and other Constitutional Courts on the Lisbon 
Treaty: French Constitutional Council, Decision of 20 December 2007, 2007-560 DC; Latvian 
Constitutional Court - judgment of 7 April 2009, 2008-35-01; Polish Constitutional Court 
– Treaty of Lisbon judgment of 16 November 2011, K32/09; Czech Constitutional Court – 
Lisbon I judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÚS 19/08 and Lisbon II judgment 3 November 
2009, PL. ÚS 29/09; as well as previous decisions of the Czech Constitutional Court, such as 
the European Arrest Warrant judgment of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04; and similar decisions of 
the Polish Constitutional Court in the Accession Treaty judgment of 11 May 2005 K18/04, as 
well as the most recent development in the decision of 16 November 2011, SK 45/09. 
71 Czech Constitutional Court, Slovak Pension XVII judgment (n 26) Part VII.
76 A. B Capik, M. Petschko: One says the things which one feels the need to say, and which ...
4 Conclusions
After the second preliminary reference from the SAC, a final asse-
ssment of the Slovak Pension Cases was for a while not possible. It can 
be stated, however, that the spectacular effect of the CCC’s ultra vires 
judgment quickly passed. With the benefit of hindsight, this can be con-
firmed by the fact that no other national court so far has drawn inspirati-
on from the judgment of the CCC.72 At least for the time being, the overall 
authority of the CJEU has not suffered a serious blow from it. On the 
contrary, the judgment has received serious criticism in academic circles, 
further weakening the already shaky position the CCC had manoeuvred 
itself into.
What happened was only to be expected in a non-hierarchical, mul-
ti-level court system, where upper level courts are not empowered to re-
verse the decisions of lower level courts. A lower level court expressed its 
strong disagreement and insisted on its own interpretation of the law. 
The European legal order has seen similar cases before (even though they 
may not have been as pronounced as the Slovak Pension Cases) and will 
certainly experience further ones. In this sense, relations between natio-
nal courts and the CJEU may be going through a period of normalisation, 
and what once was considered spectacular may now be termed banal. In 
other words: The Slovak Pension Cases developed from judicial drama to 
judicial farce.
However, what is certainly of great importance is that the courts 
involved return to an overall spirit of co-operation rather than confronta-
tion, and return to a complementary rather than competitive approach.
Last but not least, if the lack of familiarity with the procedures of 
European judicial dialogue strikingly displayed by the cases at hand lead 
to an improvement in this point and proper use of this mechanism, so-
mething bad may in the end even turn out to be something good.
72 To the best of the authors’ knowledge.
